Greg Detre
3/11/00
Mr Paul Snowdon, Exeter
token � for any mental, there is a physical process corresponding
(forAllx)(Mx � thereIsAy( Py ^ x = y ))
eliminative behaviourism
non vs eliminativism � eliminating/getting rid of
eliminative materialism = we are just physical systems � there are no mental events
non-eliminative materialism = we are just physical systems � mental events exist, but they�re just bits of that, but they�re physical
strong vs neobehaviourism
strong need not be eliminativist: reductive equivalence
neo: it all comes down to behaviour, but can't be neatly reduced
is this eliminativist???
e.g. beautifulness in music turns on notes + structures
there isn't a simple rule of beauty
isn't that begging the question???
neo: 2 things
mental � behaviour � no rule to determine how
logical relations between
using folk psychology terminology for convenience
instrumentalism/fictionalism � he thinks that P, cannot be unpacked into a simple behavioural equivalence
but there isn't an ontological state
it�s just a way of speaking that allows us to predict at the level we observe (e.g. Dennett�s intentional stance = a way of talking about each other in terms of behaviour that aids our prediction)
strong:
1. mental statement, there is an a priori conceptual equivalence with a behaviour statement
MS = BS
2. psychological facts reduce � behavioural facts, but there is no analytic reduction that one can formulaically apply (e.g. beauty in music)
G Strawson tries to rule out behaviour tautologies
he�s trying to use a wide behavioural definition, and then destroy all behaviourism in one go
what might be included in behavioural implication?
counterfactual implications, e.g. behaviour dispositions
so he says there might not even be dispositions
what is hoping then? desire, and the satisfaction of desire
hope = a psychological disposition, rather than behvaioural disposition
i.e. �/span> other mental states
does this then become like functionalism, if the states ultimately have behavioural implications, after a chain of mental states, e.g. good mood?
hope is detached from behaviour because it�s consistent with the belief that one cannot act to change the future
but in counterfactual circumstances, it could affect behaviour
3. logical relations between one sort and another (vague)
behavioural implications/entailments, Strawson�s definition of neobehaviourism
hunger = eat if opportunity arises
consequently refers to behav
mental statements are made true by behavioural facts, but without analytic rule
4. instrumentalists, e.g. Dennett, intentional stance
the real facts are behavioural, but we instrumentally apply psychological words as a desire for predicting behaviour
we can partly adopt this stance with thermostats, as we do with us, but the difference is that we really do think it of other people
qualia
state vs process
is the fact that Dennett�s intentional stance is a �useful fiction� the reason that it requires rationality to work???
no, because surely a useful fiction might only work 99% of the time, because ultimately its assumptions are simplifications, but it would still be useful
neurons firing = behaviour???